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Abstract
Context—Each year foodborne diseases (FBD) affect approximately 1 in 6 Americans, resulting 
in 128,000 hospitalizations and 3,000 deaths. Decreasing resources impact the ability of public 
health officials to identify, respond to, and control FBD outbreaks. Geographically dispersed 
outbreaks necessitate multijurisdictional coordination across all levels of the public health system. 
Rapid response depends on rapid detection.
Objective—Targeted resources were provided to state and local health departments to improve 
completeness and timeliness of laboratory, epidemiology, and environmental health (EH) 
activities for FBD surveillance and outbreak response.
Design—Foodborne Disease Centers for Outbreak Response Enhancement (FoodCORE) centers, 
selected through competitive award, implemented work plans designed to make outbreak response 
more complete and faster in their jurisdiction. Performance metrics were developed and used to 
evaluate the impact and effectiveness of activities.
Participants—Departments of Health in Connecticut, New York City, Ohio, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Utah, and Wisconsin.
Results—From the first year (Y1) of the program in October 2010 to the end of second year (Y2) 
in December 2012, the centers completed molecular subtyping for a higher proportion of 
Salmonella, Shiga toxin-producing E. coli, and Listeria (SSL) isolates (86% vs 98%) and reduced 
the average time to complete testing from a median of 8 to 4 days. The centers attempted 
epidemiologic interviews with more SSL case-patients (93% vs 99%) and the average time to 
attempt interviews was reduced from a median of 4 to 2 days. During Y2, nearly 200 EH 
assessments were conducted. FoodCORE centers began documenting model practices such as 
streamlining and standardizing case-patient interviewing.
Conclusion—Centers used targeted resources and process evaluation to implement and 
document practices that improve the completeness and timeliness of FBD surveillance and 
outbreak response activities in several public health settings. FoodCORE strategies and model 
practices could be replicated in other jurisdictions to improve FBD response.
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Introduction
Every year an estimated 48 million people become ill from foodborne diseases, resulting in 
128,000 hospitalizations and 3,000 deaths in the United States1. The landscape of food 
safety in the United States is changing as food production has become increasingly 
centralized with widely distributed products. The challenges of identifying, investigating, 
and controlling foodborne disease outbreaks are also changing. Outbreaks involve new and 
emerging pathogens and antibiotic resistance, novel foods causing illness, new routes of 
contamination, and can require multidisciplinary and multijurisdictional coordination.
Only a small proportion of all the foodborne illnesses that occur each year are part of 
recognized and reported outbreaks2. However, improved surveillance systems in the United 
States are detecting more outbreaks that would previously have been missed because they 
are widely dispersed2. In the United States, approximately 1,000 investigated outbreaks are 
reported annually through the National Outbreak Reporting System, and public health 
officials investigate many additional potential clusters of illness or outbreaks 3. Fast and 
effective investigations are necessary to identify and remove contaminated food from the 
market to prevent additional illnesses, as well as to identify gaps in the food safety system to 
prevent similar outbreaks in the future4,5.
State and local public health agencies are the frontline for disease surveillance and response 
activities6,7. A 2010 survey of state foodborne disease capacity identified the need for 
additional staff to reach full capacity; all respondents reported barriers to investigating 
foodborne disease outbreaks8. Structural capacity of public health encompasses the entire 
system of resources (human and non-human) and the relationships necessary to carry out the 
functions of public health in order to protect the health of the public9. Insufficient structural 
capacity can directly affect the completeness and timeliness of outbreak response activities 
and ability to participate in multi-jurisdictional activities. This decreases the effectiveness of 
detecting, responding to, and controlling multi-jurisdictional outbreaks10,11.
Capacity in three domains is critical to effective public health detection and response: 
laboratory, epidemiology and environmental health. One key program for the laboratory 
domain is PulseNet, the national molecular subtyping network for foodborne disease 
surveillance12. PulseNet has demonstrated how standardized laboratory subtyping can 
improve outbreak detection12,13. It was recognized that similar standardization and 
coordination was needed for outbreak response activities beyond laboratory surveillance, 
including epidemiologic and environmental health activities, and to integrate cross-cutting 
activities to have a comprehensive FBD outbreak response program13.
To help address these challenges, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
launched a program to build structural capacity in state and local health departments to 
conduct faster, more complete and standardized foodborne disease surveillance and outbreak 
response. The FoodCORE (Foodborne Diseases Centers for Outbreak Response 
Enhancement) program supports enhanced outbreak response capacity via targeted resources 
for staff support, supplies, equipment, and training in seven centers. The central objectives 
of the FoodCORE program are the collaborative development and implementation of new 
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and improved methods to detect, investigate, respond to, and control multistate outbreaks of 
foodborne diseases. FoodCORE aims to improve state and local foodborne disease outbreak 
response and investigations by building capacity; developing collaborative surveillance and 
response programs; conducting rapid, coordinated, standardized investigations; developing 
and implementing measurable performance indicators, and identifying and documenting 
replicable model practices14.
This paper describes key results and accomplishments of the FoodCORE program after the 
first two years of implementation following the one year pilot. This paper also provides an 
overview of the FoodCORE model practices developed to date. These model practices are 
based on quantitative measures and capture the lessons learned and processes that the 
FoodCORE centers have used to successfully improve their outbreak response programs.
Methods
FoodCORE centers were selected through competitive award via CDC’s Epidemiology and 
Laboratory Capacity (ELC) cooperative agreement. During October 1, 2011 to December 
31, 2012 (Year Two, Y2), seven centers participated in FoodCORE: Connecticut, New York 
City, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, and Wisconsin, covering about 14% of the 
U.S. population, or about 43 million individuals15. The average annual award under this 
agreement was $360,000 (range approximately $190,000 to $510,000). The centers designed 
individual work plans to address the core programmatic activity areas in their jurisdiction. 
The centers implemented their work plans, developed and operationalized FoodCORE 
performance metrics, collaborated with other food safety programs, conducted trainings, and 
contributed to the development and testing of new tools and technologies.
Improved laboratory capacity addressed surveillance activities to speed up submitting 
specimens to the public health laboratories (PHL) in each FoodCORE center, conduct more 
serotyping and molecular subtyping, and improving communication of laboratory findings to 
investigative partners. Improved epidemiology capacity addressed conducting rapid, 
coordinated, standardized investigations so interviews are conducted faster and clusters and 
outbreaks are detected earlier. Improved environmental health capacity addressed 
conducting assessments that incorporate laboratory and epidemiologic data to help identify 
factors most likely related to an outbreak, collecting data for and participating in traceback 
efforts to help identify food vehicles and sources of contaminations, and providing training 
for local specialists to standardize environmental health activities.
Laboratory surveillance was improved by hiring additional staff to complete testing and 
contribute to the timely communication of results to other health department staff as well as 
to national surveillance systems. Resources were also used to purchase and maintain 
equipment and reagents necessary to allow faster, more complete laboratory testing. This 
added capacity allowed the public health laboratories in each center to conduct molecular 
subtyping for all serotypes. Epidemiologic interviewing and investigation were similarly 
improved by augmenting the number of staff and supporting the improvement of 
technology-based solutions for data sharing, outbreak and cluster surveillance, and activity 
tracking. Six centers used student-based teams to add capacity for interviewing, data entry, 
Biggerstaff Page 3
J Public Health Manag Pract. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 July 01.
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
conducting analytic epidemiologic studies, and to assist with other activities as needed at 
state and local health departments. The seventh center used regional staff to conduct these 
activities. This additional capacity allowed public health officials to conduct thorough 
epidemiologic surveillance and investigation activities. Environmental health capacity was 
improved with support for staff and resources for trainings and cross-cutting activities that 
enhance collaboration and communication between laboratory, epidemiology, and 
environmental health staff. See Table 1.
FoodCORE centers capitalized on the completeness and timeliness of specimen subtyping to 
quickly identify clusters of illness. Results were routinely analyzed and compared to 
centralized databases (e.g., PulseNet) so clusters of isolates with indistinguishable subtypes 
can be detected. Laboratory surveillance data were rapidly and routinely exchanged between 
the core areas. The FoodCORE centers had standing meetings and routine reports for cluster 
detection and laboratory results as well as protocols to exchange data in real-time during an 
outbreak so findings from all areas inform ongoing activities.
The FoodCORE metrics were used to evaluate progress towards goals, identify gaps, and 
document successes. These metrics, available at http://www.cdc.gov/foodcore/metrics.html, 
were based on chapter 8 of the CIFOR Guidelines and are reported separately by 
pathogen16,17. Metrics data were reported for the burden, completeness, and timeliness of 
foodborne disease activities from surveillance and outbreak detection through investigation, 
response, control, and implementation of prevention measures. Over time, metrics data 
quantitatively demonstrate changes in completeness and timeliness18.
Metrics data for Salmonella, Shiga toxin-producing E. coli, and Listeria (SSL) were reported 
for the first half of Year One, Y1, (10/1/2010 – 3/31/2011), all of Y1 (10/1/2010 – 9/30/11) 
and all of Y2. A full description of the performance metrics data for Y1, including within-
year comparisons, is available on the FoodCORE website18. Metrics for investigations for 
norovirus, other etiologies (i.e., not norovirus or SSL), and unknown etiologies, collectively 
referred to as NOU, were operationalized during Y2. Representative pre-funding data are 
generally not available for the FoodCORE centers as collection and reporting of 
performance metrics did not begin until additional resources were available. Therefore, data 
from the first half of Y1 were used as a comparative baseline. While using this as 
comparative baseline under-represents the full scale of improvements achieved under 
FoodCORE, it was the most complete representation of performance during program 
initiation. Analyses were conducted using SAS 9.3.
Results
Improving Laboratory Surveillance Activities
The FoodCORE laboratories, the PHL in each FoodCORE center, received an average, or 
mean, of nearly 9,000 isolates and isolate-yielding specimens of SSL from clinical 
laboratories, foods, and environmental sampling each year during Y1 and Y2. The first or 
representative SSL isolate or sample from each person or non-human testing unit is called a 
primary isolate. During Y1, the laboratories received 8,547 primary SSL isolates; 7,677 
(90%) Salmonella, 787 (9%) STEC, and 83 (1%) Listeria isolates. During Y2, the 
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FoodCORE laboratories received 8,161 primary isolates; 6,786 (83%) Salmonella, 1,190 
(15%) STEC, and 185 (2%) Listeria isolates.
During Y2, the average time from isolation or specimen collection to receipt at the PHL 
decreased from a median of 8 days (9, 5, and 10 days for Salmonella, STEC, and Listeria, 
respectively) at baseline, to a median of 6 days (7, 5, and 7 days for Salmonella, STEC, and 
Listeria, respectively) in Y1, and further reduced to a median of 5 days (6 days for both 
Salmonella and Listeria and 5 days for STEC) in Y2. The average proportion of Salmonella 
isolates that were serotyped was maintained at 99% during Y2. The average proportion of 
STEC isolates serotyped increased from 86% at baseline, to 88% in Y1, and to 95% in Y2 
(supplemental digital content). For Salmonella, the turnaround time (TAT) to complete 
serotyping, the number of days from receipt of an isolate until serotyping is completed, 
decreased from an average 8-day median during baseline to 6 days in Y1 and further to 4 
days (2 – 6 days) during Y2. The average TAT for STEC serotyping was maintained at the 
same levels as baseline (5 day median) and the longest TAT decreased from a high of 42 
days during Y1 to 7 days in Y2 (Table 2).
Similar improvements for the completeness and timeliness of PFGE subtyping were 
documented in Y2. The average proportion of isolates with PFGE data increased as follows: 
for Salmonella from 82% (range 28 – 100%) during baseline to 98% (range 94 – 100%) in 
Y2; for STEC from 93% (range 67 – 100%) during baseline to 97% (range 89 – 100%) in 
Y2; and for Listeria from 82% (range 26 – 100%) during baseline to 99% (91 – 100%) in 
Y2 (Figure 1). The average TAT for SSL PFGE, the number of days from receipt of an 
isolate until PFGE results are uploaded to PulseNet, was reduced from a median of 13 days 
during baseline to 5 days in Y2 for Salmonella (range 4 – 40 days and 2 – 13 days, 
respectively); from 5 days during baseline to 4 days in Y2 for STEC (range 3 – 8 days and 2 
– 7 days, respectively); and from 6 days during baseline to 4 days in Y2 for Listeria (range 2 
– 16 days and 2 – 7 days, respectively), (Table 2).
Improving Epidemiologic Interviews and Investigations
During Y2, epidemiology programs were notified of 8,001 SSL case-patients including 
6,800 (85%) Salmonella, 1,061 (13%) STEC, and 140 (2%) Listeria case-patients. On 
average, an interview was attempted for nearly every SSL case-patient during Y2 (average 
99%, range 98 – 100%), this is an increase from the baseline period when the average was 
93% (range 88 – 100%). Pathogen-specific proportions of case-patients with an attempted 
interview improved as follows: for Salmonella, from 88% (range 53 – 100%) during 
baseline to 98% (range 94 – 100%) in Y2; for STEC from 90% (range 60 – 100%) during 
baseline to 98% (90 – 100%); on average all (100%) of Listeria case-patients had an 
attempted interview during both time periods (Figure 2). Centers also attempted interviews 
more quickly, reducing the average TAT for attempting SSL interviews, the number of days 
from notification to interview attempt, from nearly 4 days to 2 days.
Interview data collected from ill persons by FoodCORE Centers align with the Listeria 
Initiative Case-patient Report Form20, the Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli 
Standardized Case-patient Report Form21, and the Core Elements defined within the 
Standardized National Hypothesis Generating Questionnaire22. The centers increased the 
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proportion of case-patients with an exposure history, with a baseline average of 69% versus 
Y2 average of 86%.
Improving Cross-Cutting Outbreak Response Activities
During Y2, the FoodCORE centers identified a total of 594 SSL clusters of illness and 
conducted 442 NOU illness investigations. The centers usually identified clusters early 
when the number of case-patients was small; on average, the SSL clusters of illness had a 
median of only two associated illnesses. As part of these investigations, 178 environmental 
health assessments were conducted and 92 food, environmental, or other non-human 
samples were collected for testing (supplemental digital content). A total of 122 analytic 
studies were conducted (30 Salmonella, 20 STEC, 2 Listeria, 44 norovirus, 14 other 
etiology, and 12 unknown etiology). On average, 17% of SSL illness clusters and 33% of 
NOU illness investigations identified a suspect vehicle or source; a confirmed vehicle or 
source was identified in 13% of SSL illness clusters and 21% of NOU illness investigations. 
A total of 118 public health actions were taken in response to SSL and NOU investigations 
with an identified vehicle or source, including exclusion of ill person(s), remediation or 
closure of an establishment, educational campaigns, media or public messaging, and food 
product recalls and holds (supplemental digital content).
Success Stories
These investigations and public health actions helped stop or control outbreaks and kept 
additional people from becoming ill. There are numerous examples of the successful 
investigations and intervention activities in the FoodCORE centers. A catalog of success 
stories is maintained on the FoodCORE website with details about investigations and the 
center’s outbreak response activities: http://www.cdc.gov/foodcore/successes.html. The 
success stories are short, easy-to-read, one to two page documents that describe a specific 
event or outbreak. From outbreaks of Salmonella infections associated with raw scraped 
ground tuna, queso fresco, and chicken livers, to norovirus outbreaks related to infected 
animals or contaminated recreational water, the centers used targeted resources to detect 
more outbreaks, conduct thorough investigations, control outbreaks faster, and help stop the 
spread of foodborne disease.
For example, FoodCORE played a key role in solving a 2012 multistate outbreak of 
Salmonella infections linked to imported frozen raw scraped ground tuna, a substitute for 
minced tuna in sushi. FoodCORE laboratories in five of the seven centers identified people 
infected with the same rare serotypes, Bareilly and Nchanga. These centers contributed 
critical evidence that accelerated the investigation. Public health officials in the centers 
rapidly interviewed case-patients to determine which foods and where the sick people ate. 
Many reported eating sushi the week before they became sick. This information was crucial 
to focus the investigation and identify a suspect food vehicle. Ultimately 425 cases from 28 
states and the District of Columbia were identified in the outbreak23. The FoodCORE 
centers efficiently worked together with other involved health departments and regulatory 
partners to pinpoint the ground tuna product as the likely source of illness and were among 
the first to find the Salmonella PFGE strains in the contaminated tuna. The product was 
recalled, which likely prevented many more illnesses, since the frozen product would have 
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been available for consumption for many more months if it had not been removed from the 
market.
Model Practices for Improving Outbreak Response
Through the application of performance metrics, FoodCORE centers complete ongoing 
process evaluation to identify practices that effectively improve completeness and timeliness 
for outbreak response activities that are consistently successful across the various public 
health infrastructures represented within the program. During Y2, the centers began 
documenting these model practices to make them available for other public health 
jurisdictions to use as a resource to inform evaluation and improvement efforts. The 
FoodCORE model practices are drafted by program staff and reviewed by all the centers and 
are publically available on the FoodCORE website24.
The first model practice for initial case-patient interviewing describes successful triage and 
routing of case-patient reporting and the process of attempting interviews with case-patients, 
recommends categories and elements identified as essential to ascertain during an initial 
enteric disease interview, and provides a checklist to determine alignment of initial 
interview practices with the FoodCORE model practice. The second model practice for 
laboratory completeness and timeliness describes the successful laboratory practices used by 
FoodCORE PHLs for isolate and specimen submissions, subtyping of enteric pathogens, 
communication of laboratory results, and cluster detection reports. Additional model 
practice documents are forthcoming, including practices for integration across activities and 
successfully using student interview teams.
Discussion
FoodCORE centers have demonstrated that relatively modest targeted investments can 
improve the completeness and timeliness of outbreak response activities. The centers have 
leveraged FoodCORE resources to coordinate with local jurisdictions, other states and 
federal partners, and other food safety programs. Overall, they have built-up outbreak 
response programs for routine and surge capacity needs to conduct faster, better, more 
complete investigations, to ultimately help stop the spread of foodborne disease.
FoodCORE PHLs report that they are PFGE subtyping nearly all received isolates (average 
of 98% for SSL). By completing PFGE subtyping for a high proportion of isolates 
FoodCORE laboratories have identified clusters of illness earlier than they would have 
previously, including clusters that would likely have been missed entirely before 
implementing complete PFGE subtyping.
FoodCORE centers have the capacity to attempt interviews with nearly every reported case-
patient (average of 99% for SSL). The centers capitalize on having additional staff so they 
can conduct interviews as soon as case-patients are identified. Prompt interviewing 
improves the chances of a case-patient remembering what they ate before becoming ill and 
decreases recall bias because interviewers are asking about recent exposures instead of about 
a month or more in the past.
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Faster and more complete interviewing in centers with a decentralized infrastructure was the 
result of close collaboration with local public health jurisdictions. In a decentralized 
infrastructure local health departments, including county, city, rural, or regional 
departments, independently provide public health services. Therefore, FoodCORE staff in 
decentralized states built on partnerships with local officials to determine how they could 
implement centralized interviewing together to complement local efforts and provide much 
needed relief or surge capacity for interviewing.
Quickly identifying and investigating clusters helps develop hypotheses about the vehicle 
causing illness. The earlier a suspect vehicle is identified, the more quickly public health 
officials can focus on collecting information about suspect items, such as how they were 
prepared, when and where they were purchased, and their source. They can also try to 
collect products or non-human samples to test for the causative agent.
Some average measures did not show improvement, but were maintained at the same level 
overtime. Pathogens with fewer cases and that may cause more severe infection (e.g. STEC 
or Listeria) may not be as subject to triage if there is limited capacity.
Collaborations between laboratory, epidemiology, and environment health partners ensure 
that pertinent information is shared throughout a cluster investigation. When 
multidisciplinary teams coordinate to conduct fast, thorough investigations it increases the 
likelihood of identifying the food vehicle or other source of an outbreak, controlling the 
outbreak by removing that source to keep additional people from getting sick, and 
pinpointing how and why contamination occurred so that similar outbreaks can be prevented 
in the future.
Strengths
The FoodCORE performance metrics allow for a quantitative approach to process 
evaluation. The metrics are used to identify when a strategy has successfully improved 
completeness and timeliness, help set and gauge the success of meeting realistic program 
goals related to outbreak response activities, and quantify the workload required to support 
the ultimate goal of controlling outbreaks. In addition to applying performance metrics, 
FoodCORE documents the strategies used to successfully improve completeness and 
timeliness of outbreak response activities. By documenting these model practices, the 
lessons learned by the FoodCORE centers are available to other jurisdictions wishing to 
improve their foodborne outbreak response activities. The FoodCORE model practices, 
coupled with resources like the CIFOR Guidelines, can help other jurisdictions make 
process and system changes that have been shown to improve completeness and timeliness.
Limitations
This report is subject to at least two main limitations. Only two years of metrics data were 
available and data were not reported separately for all four quarters of Y1 and Y2. These 
factors limited analyses of trends, but additional analyses will become feasible in the future 
with continued reporting.
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The remarkable achievements documented during Y1 and Y2 only represent a fraction of the 
improvements that have been realized in the FoodCORE centers. Because representative 
data available are not generally available from before the program began, the successes of 
the FoodCORE centers are all framed as increases over a baseline period that occurred after 
initial funding. Limited data available in a few sites indicate that the true, pre-funding status 
from which the centers have progressed was likely much lower, so these results 
underestimate what was accomplished. For example, the average proportion of Salmonella 
cases with an interview attempt was 88% during the baseline period; this increased to 98% 
in Y2. However, in New York City, available pre-funding data show a much larger increase. 
Before funding, interviews were only attempted for 7% of Salmonella case-patients 
compared to nearly 90% currently. Similarly, in Connecticut, pre-funding data show that 
before FoodCORE, only about half of Salmonella case-patients were interviewed; since 
joining FoodCORE, this proportion has increased to over 80%. Despite the serious 
limitation of not having representative pre-funding data, the results presented and discussed 
here indicate that with modest, targeted resources great gains for faster, more complete 
outbreak response are achievable and similar investments in other public health jurisdictions 
or programs could yield similar results.
Conclusion
FoodCORE demonstrates that the application of targeted resources coupled with process 
evaluation is an effective means to identify, implement, and document model practices that 
successfully improve the completeness and timeliness of foodborne disease outbreak 
response activities. Through the second year of enhanced outbreak response activity 
implementation, the FoodCORE centers documented improvements and maintenance of 
complete and timely laboratory and epidemiologic activities related to foodborne disease 
outbreak investigation and response. By conducting fast, thorough investigations, 
FoodCORE centers contribute critical information to help solve outbreaks quickly, remove 
contaminated foods from commerce, and protect additional people from getting sick.
Sustained support of this program is needed to maintain improved outbreak response 
activities in FoodCORE centers so that they can continue to fully contribute to the 
identification and control of multistate foodborne disease outbreaks. FoodCORE centers will 
continue to identify and document more model practices that can be applied in various 
public health settings. These model practices can inform efforts to improve outbreak 
response in other state and local health departments or international public health settings 
with similar infrastructures for foodborne disease surveillance and response. Cost 
effectiveness analyses are needed to quantitatively determine short and long-term utilities 
for targeted application of funds for initial program start-up and maintenance of the gains 
achieved with enhanced structural capacity.
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Figure 1. Mean and range of the proportion of Salmonella, Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia 
coli (STEC), and Listeria isolates with PFGE subtyping data available for the baseline period of 
Year 1, all of Year 1, and Year 2*
*For Salmonella, n(baseline)=1618, n(Y1)=7677, n(Y2)=6786; For STEC, n(baseline)=216, 
n(Y1)=787, n(Y2)=1190; For Listeria, n(baseline)=53, n(Y1)=83, n(Y2)=185.
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Figure 2. Average and range of the proportion of Salmonella, Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia 
coli (STEC), and Listeria case-patients with an attempted interview for the baseline period of 
Year 1, all of Year 1, and Year 2*
*For Salmonella, n(baseline)=1626, n(Y1)=7039, n(Y2)=6800; For STEC, n(baseline)=194, 
n(Y1)=820, n(Y2)=1061; For Listeria, n(baseline)=31, n(Y1)=92, n(Y2)=140.
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